COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE

CSS SEMINAR - FRIDAY, JANUARY 22 - CHEN

Friday, January 22, 3:00 p.m.
Center for Social Complexity Suite
3rd Floor, Research Hall

Matching Impacts of School Admission Mechanisms: An Agent-Based Approach

Shu-Heng Chen, Distinguished Professor
Director, AI-ECON Research Center
Department of Economics
National Chengchi University

Abstract: Matching mechanisms determine the assignments of students to schools. Their effects depend on students’ reactions and are multifaceted in complex educational systems. They are constantly debated especially in fiercely competitive admission systems, such as the ones in China. We simulated three matching mechanisms (Serial Dictatorship, the Boston mechanism, and the Chinese Parallel mechanism) under different policy settings, school capacities, and behavioral scenarios to evaluate the outcomes including their distribution effects against different policy goals. We conclude that agent-based simulations are able to provide rich and many-sided information to all stakeholders and thus facilitate comprehensive public discourses on school admission policies.